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| Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, - good morning. Some six months ago our Program Chairman, Pratap Misra, asked me if I would be willing to address the ION National Technical Meeting as an introduction to the Plenary Session. In his request he suggested a talk that was somewhat provocative, maybe a little controversial, but nevertheless stimulating and challenging. It is indeed an honor to be asked and also it was my pleasure to accept this invitation. I trust that you will find my comments comply with the chairman’s request. |
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| All Change in Washington: On November 6th my wife and I flew over from our summer sojourn in England to cast our vote in Florida for the next President of the United States. We all know only too well the ensuing saga that took place in the Florida courts and the Supreme Court of the United States but, contentious as it may have been, we do have a President and a new Administration. Of course this means a change in people and policies in Washington that, in my opinion, will have a significant effect on the radionavigation discipline worldwide. My presentation this morning provides you with the reasons for this opinion. |
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| Loran Baggage: First let me set the record straight. Some say that my radionavigation objectivity is clouded by the baggage I carry having been an advocate of loran for almost 40 years and now being President of the International Loran Association for the second time in 23 years, I ask you to balance this with my firm belief and advocacy of satellite technology that originates with the Soviet Sputnik 1 launched in October of 1957. I was fortunate to be on the team in the UK that was one of the first to determine the orbital parameters of that historic small beeping object in space, so my interest in satellite technology predates that of loran.1 |
| Satellite Technology Here to Stay: It goes without saying that satellite technology for positioning and the provision of precise time is here to stay. The technology has revolutionized the way we do business in a wide diversity of disciplines and has significantly contributed to the global economy. So pervasive and successful is the technology that many governments are questioning the continued need for alternative terrestrially-based systems in the belief that satellites will do all that is required. The road to total dependency on a single technology, or even a single system for positioning and precise time, is clearly signposted "Free Ride" for those willing to take this risk, a policy that has been encouraged by the United States government. |
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| U.S. GPS Promotion: The U.S. promotion of GPS worldwide and the discouragement given to other nations to provide alternative satellite constellations is legend. It is clearly stated in a Rand Study2 and was supported by Congress in legislation that prevented U.S. funds from finding their way to support the Russian GLONASS. Directives to the U.S. Department of Transportation and the content of the 1994 Federal Radionavigation Plan (FRP) have left little doubt as to this policy. |
| Meeting Program: In order not to appear redundant in my remarks, I spent several hours reading 117 abstracts of the papers that are to be presented here in the three days of the meeting. In spite of the fact that some authors seem to have written their entire paper in the abstract, I thank you for the explicit and detailed information. |
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| Here is an analysis of the subject matter contained in the abstracts. As you see, nearly half the papers to be presented cover GPS developments and a quarter of them address use of GPS as a sole means of navigation – a clear indication of where the money and interest lies. |
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| GPS World Showcase: Further, I read 34 essays on the future outlook of GPS published in GPS World Showcase 2001. A wide spectrum of thoughts are expressed, but if one invokes a "feel good filter" to remove the euphoria and market hype, one finds some sound rational views and a good deal of reality that my remarks will support. |
| GPS Sole-Means: Without question the United States was first down the road to GPS total dependency. After the publication of the 1992 U.S. FRP and preceding the publication of the 1994 FRP, a policy decision was made at the highest government level mandating that the U.S. Global Positioning System would ultimately be the only radionavigation service provided by the government giving birth to the sole-means, sole-service policy. The 1994 FRP reflected this policy and provided schedules for the termination of all federal terrestrial systems. Since its publication there has been a softening of the government’s position, not so much in the ultimate goal of sole means but in the schedule to reach that state. |
| Reality Sets In: To a certain degree reality has set in. Two decades of GPS use, and to a lesser extent GLONASS, has shown that, along with the successes, the limitations and weaknesses of satellite technology in its current embodiment have surfaced. The need for augmentations to provide integrity and overcome signal propagation effects is now generally conceded. |
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| Signal availability has come under scrutiny, and, most importantly, the vulnerability of the technology, the GPS system and the signals transmitted have been raised.3 |
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| Hanging on a Single Thread: Further, and perhaps of greater significance, another dimension has been added. GPS is seen as the main source for precise time upon which modern day digital communication is dependent. And taking one more step we find that in aviation, surveillance, as in ADS-B, is dependent upon GPS time - making communications, navigation and surveillance all tied to one system. What we are witnessing is the success of a technology drawing us into an untenable situation wherein our total economic infrastructure and human safety will hang from a single thread thus creating an unacceptable risk to life, the economy and national security. |
| Multiple Constellations: It has been proposed that the sole dependency issue can be solved by the use of multiple constellations operated by different states. This raises the sovereignty issue of dependence upon a foreign power of which the European Union is acutely aware. Reversing the roles and, what is to some a hypocritical policy, there appears to be no appetite in the U.S. or any move towards using another nation’s system in spite of the fact that this is a U.S. GPS policy directed towards others. |
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| Risk Goes Unrecognized: The crux of the matter is that the three branches of the U.S. Government and its agencies do not perceive or accept that the level of risk warrants definitive and immediate remedial action. Studies such as the Risk Analysis conducted by the Johns Hopkins University4 are provided with the spin necessary to support the government’s position by stating that GPS sole-means is achievable. Other studies are sequestered or simply not delivered as required.5 Since the risks are being ignored it follows that there is a lack of understanding by people who are in a position to act but do not have the knowledge – or desire - to perceive the risks. |
| This is serious stuff and I will tell you why: |
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| Unrestricted Warfare: Just under two years ago two intelligent and well-read Senior Colonels of the People’s Liberation Army in China published a book with the title "Unrestricted Warfare".6 In part one the authors provide an in-depth study of the Gulf War and further they describe the follow up analysis of the war performed by the U.S. Department of Defense. Establishing that the Gulf War would be the last of its kind, the second part of the book defines in detail how a nation militarily weaker than the United States can prevail in what has become known as asymmetric warfare. Military and non-military forces are employed in an undefined battlefield that includes non-combat civil infrastructure destruction using infowar, terrorism, hacking, financial disruption, etc. No holds are barred; the aggressor follows no rules and the opponent’s non-military weaknesses are continuously probed for disruption or destruction. |
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| Other Texts: Standing by itself the book might be dismissed as science fiction but it is not alone. Since the book was translated into English there have been a number of important texts issued to which I will very briefly call your attention,:7,8 |
Slide 12: Other Texts Table
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| Unrestricted Warfare | Book | Qiao and Wang | Feb. 1999 |
| The Cox Report: U.S. Nat. Security/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China | Unclassified
Report |
Christopher Cox Chairman | Jan. 1999 |
| The China Threat: How the People’s Republic Targets America | Book | Bill Gertz | 2000 |
| China’s Plan to Dominate Asia and the World | Book | Stephen W. Mosher | 2000 |
| The Information Revolution and National Security | U.S.
Army
Report |
Thomas
E. Copeland
Editor |
Aug. 2000 |
| Serious Weakness Continues to Place Defense Operations at Risk | GAO Report | Various | Aug. 1999 |
| Cyberwarfare: China moving aggressively to incorporate Cyberwarfare into military lexicon. | CRS
Report
RL 30735 |
Steven Hildreth | Nov. 2000 |
| Defending America’s Cyberspace: National Plan for Information Systems Protection | The White House | Various | 2000 |
| Cyber Threats and Information Security – Meeting the 21st Century Challenge | CSIS Report | Various | Dec. 2000 |
| Vulnerability Assessment of the Transportation Infrastructure Relying on the Global Positioning System | Report VNTSC | James Carroll | July 2000 |
| GPS Vulnerability | Navy ppt presentation | LCDR Drew Williams | Nov. 2000 |
| Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization | Report pursuant to PL 106-65 | Donald
H. Rumsfeld
Chairman (to Dec. 18) |
Jan. 2001 |
| United States Commission on National Security/21st Century | Phase III Report issued Jan 31, 2001 | Gary Hart and Warren Rudman Co-Chairs | Jan. 2001 |
| All of the above and the vast amount of pertinent information that is currently available on the Internet has a common theme that echoes the observations and definition of future aggressions described in detail by Qiao and Wang. But I would draw your close attention to the report issued by the Center for Strategic and International Studies on December 14, 2000 – Cyber Threats and Information Security – Meeting the 21st Century Challenge and, in particular, the report sent to Congress on January 11, 2001 issued by the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization, and the most recent report on Phase III of the United States Commission on National Security/21st Century | |||
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| Rumsfeld Commission: The Commission to Assess United States Security Space Management and Organization convened in June 2000 pursuant to Public Law 106-65 chaired by Donald H. Rumsfeld until December 28 when he was nominated by President George Bush for Secretary of Defense, a position that he has previously held.9 This 150+ page report is the first definitive response that clearly defines the vulnerability of space assets to attack and the remedial action that is required. The report is addressed to the Chairmen of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, the current Secretary of Defense, the Majority and Minority leaders of the House and Senate and other Armed Services Committee members. In this respect it has the highest political visibility. | |||
| For me the situation is summed up in a few sentences on page xv of the Executive Summary and I quote:10 | |||
| That U.S. space systems might be threatened or attacked in such contingencies may seem improbable, even reckless. However, as political economist Thomas Schelling has pointed out. | |||
| "There is a tendency in our planning to confuse the unfamiliar with the improbable. The contingency we have not considered looks strange; what looks strange is thought improbable; what is improbable need not be considered seriously." | |||
| Surprise is most often not a lack of warning, but the result of a tendency to dismiss as reckless what we consider improbable. | |||
| History is replete with instances in which warning signs were ignored and change resisted until an external, "improbable" event forced resistant bureaucracies to take action. The question is whether the U.S. will be wise enough to act responsibly and soon enough to reduce U.S. space vulnerability. Or whether, as in the past, a disabling attack against the country and its people—a "Space Pearl Harbor"—will be the only event able to galvanize the nation and cause the U.S. Government to act. | |||
| We are on notice, but we have not noticed. | |||
| End Quote | |||
| Remedial Actions: The remedial actions recommended are extensive requiring massive expenditures for new space technologies and to carry defensive and offensive weapons into space. To accomplish this, a major reorganization of the military space forces and intelligence community is proposed. What is particularly interesting is that the remedial action is placed at the foot of the Secretary of Defense who is the past Chairman of the Committee recommending the action; a fact that bodes well for decisive action! | |||
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| Weapons in Space: Placing weapons in space will add a new dimension to the reliance of space for civil applications raising the question as to whether this action will increase or decrease the risk of space hostilities leading to the denial or loss of space assets. It should surely serve as a warning to be more circumspect about sole-means use as nations and terrorists acquire the technology to damage or destroy satellites. How would we fare with the loss of GPS for days, weeks, months or even years? Are the indulgent Western democracies willing or able to recognize and deal with this type of risk? | |||
| The BSE Parallel: At this point I would like to give a brief account of a disturbing parallel of tragic human dimensions that was the subject of the lead article in the Wall Street Journal two weeks ago and captured headline news in Europe and the U.S. last week.11 | |||
| There is a regular humorous game program on the BBC called "Have I Got News For You." At one point in the program a series of pictures are shown and the panelists are asked to identify the persons and what they are doing. | |||
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| Can anyone identify who is portrayed in this picture and what they are doing? | |||
| BSE Denial: In the mid 1970s the index case – the first case – of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy or BSE, better known as Mad Cow Disease, was identified in a cow in England. Ten years later there were numerous cases reported and at that time a number of researchers warned the government agencies involved of the safety risk to humans. Initially the government suppressed this scientific information and initiated a campaign of public reassurance that British beef was safe to eat. The picture of John Gummer in 1989, Britain’s then Agriculture Minister, eating a hamburger with his daughter while stating that British beef is safe beyond doubt will long be remembered as one of the British government’s biggest publicity gaffs. I would like you to retain this picture in your mind as this story and its parallel unfolds. | |||
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| Scientists Suppressed: In the following years the disease became an epidemic costing the British government and the farming industry more than 6 billion dollars and the loss of the beef industry. Millions of cattle had to be destroyed.12 During all this time the government was in denial that there was any human risk. Internal documents were "managed" and whistle blowers marginalized, losing their jobs in some instances. BSE research contracts with those who disagreed with government policy were not renewed and the individual researchers silenced. | |||
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| BSE Peal Harbor: Then in 1994 it happened just as the scientists had warned – BSE jumped species and the first case of new-variant Creutzfeld-Jacob’s Disease, nvCJD, was identified. A hideous, debilitating condition having no known cure and followed by certain death. Worse, the incubation time is estimated at 10 to 20 years or more. Since 1994 the number of cases has steadily risen, mainly in young people. The future is unknown.13 What went wrong? | |||
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| The Inquiry: The families of the victims got together and demanded that the government conduct an independent inquiry. The job was given to Lord Phillips. After two and a half years and an expenditure of $39 million, Lord Phillips released the findings of his inquiry team in a 16 volume report on October 26, 2000. The conclusions reached and lessons learned are contained in one volume, and I suggest, no implore, that this should be required reading for anyone involved in risk management, especially those in public service. | |||
| Inquiry Report Conclusions: The inquiry determined that the government had assessed the risk to human health to be small and therefore could be dismissed. Further, the inquiry found the government became preoccupied with shielding the public from the facts to avoid over-reaction. Reassurances were given that jumping species was not possible and therefore there was no risk to human health. Studies were conducted to confirm this position and anyone getting out of line was suppressed. The media called this a cover-up, but Lord Phillips is kinder suggesting that the system of government was unable to assess and act on the potential risk. Civil servants were called to task for not communicating between agencies and to government ministers. | |||
| The GPS Parallel: Apart from the human tragedy, the disquieting aspect of the Phillips report is the similarity with the U.S. government’s assessment and non-action with respect to the risks associated with sole dependency on GPS for position determination and precise time distribution. For many of the administrative conclusions in the Phillips report there is a strong parallel with the sole-means GPS policy. Absence of contingency plans; protection of jobs; secrecy; inadequate attention to the risks to the public; eagerness to restrain expenditure; protection of the export market; disregarded warnings to the Cabinet; poor coordination between governmental departments; too much time in consultation before acting on advice received; and other conclusions are all cited as deficiencies that led to the crisis and the subsequent finger pointing within the Government. | |||
| Europe Did Not Take Heed: In spite of the obvious and, as reported in the Wall Street Journal articles, the EU and states such as Germany and France maintained an attitude of denial for 5 years after the first case of nvCJD for fear of panicking the public; being required to slaughter their cattle herds; and crippling the national beef industries. | |||
| Lessons Learned: It could be concluded that the structure of western democratic governments is unsuited to deal with intangible risk because to do so might lead to corporate and public discomfort. Government priorities are set by special interests and public polls. The economy and jobs dictate policy. Although an extended unavailability of GPS would be devastating to the U.S. economy, the loss of GPS service has not been perceived as a risk to be addressed – until, maybe, the release of the Rumsfeld Commission report that clearly identifies the threat and risk and puts the new Administration and Congress on notice. | |||
| Commission Charter: The Rumsfeld Commission charter focused the committee on the protection of space assets and the management of space programs to retain space supremacy and maintain national security. Unfortunately the charter did not include a study of mitigating risk by diversity of complementary space and terrestrial systems, and this is where Loran-C can play a vital and unique role at minimal cost. | |||
| The Loran-C Complement: The continuous, uninterrupted availability of precise time is now one of the essential foundations of our modern society. Until the advent of GPS, Loran-C was the backbone of precise time for a multitude of applications including communications and power distribution.14 Following the announcement by the Department of Transportation that Loran-C would be terminated in the year 2000 many have now turned to GPS for this vital service. As we move towards sole dependency on GPS our critical infrastructure becomes vulnerable to attack as has been pointed out time and time again in the open literature. In addition to precise time, Loran-C provides a positioning and navigation service that is more than adequate for many applications and as a complement to GPS can provide a soft landing in the event of an interruption of GPS service. | |||
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| Loran-C Upgrades: It is fortunate that in spite of indecision and vacillation by the Department of Transportation, the U.S. Congress has had the foresight to provide funds for the upgrade of all U.S. Loran-C facilities. The recapitalization program being conducted by the U.S. Coast Guard is well underway. When complete, Loran-C stations will be automated and unattended reducing annual operating costs by 50% to an estimated $12 to $15 million for the entire nation or 15% of the cost of one in-orbit GPS space vehicle. | |||
| Future of Loran-C: The current 1999 FRP states that the Loran-C service will be continued in the short-term while the long-term requirements for the system are being evaluated. The overt evaluation consists of a small narrowly focused program within the FAA to see whether Loran-C can serve a useful purpose in the National Airspace System. In my opinion a program of this nature is totally inconsistent with the vital role Loran-C must play in the protection of the critical infrastructure. The future of Loran-C is an interagency matter affecting the nation’s economy and national security and should be treated in this light by elevating the decision-making responsibility to the highest level of government consistent with that of the Rumsfeld Commission report on Space Management and Organization and the Hart-Rudman Commission on National Security/21st Century. | |||
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| Meanwhile in Europe: The Ministerial meeting in December 2000 relating to the Galileo project was adjourned until April 2001 due to lack of consensus over funding delaying the Loran-C/Eurofix/Galileo integration proposals. Eurofix, the Loran-C communications and satellite integrity data link is now operational on four European Loran-C transmitters. The Global AUgmentation for Satellite Systems (GAUSS) initiative was successful in getting the specifications for Loran-C communications adopted at ITU. These and other programs will be the subjects for the upcoming Loran-C/Eurofix EGNOS/Galileo meeting in Bonn, February 20-21, 2001 hosted by the German Institute of Navigation. | |||
| End Piece: Time has not permitted a discussion of aviation specific terrestrial systems such as ILS, MLS, VOR/DME. These systems will be with us for a long time and their future will be determined by those responsible for flight safety. In this presentation I have dwelt on the world radionavigation from a United States perspective because GPS is a U.S. system and employed throughout the world. My comments apply equally to Europe’s proposed Galileo system and the terrestrial Loran-C complement now operational under the umbrella of an intergovernmental treaty organization NELS.15 | |||
| None of this dialogue should be construed as detracting from the use of satellite technology and reaping its benefits. It is the underpinning of the technology that must be of concern to us all. | |||
| The threats are real and have been widely publicized. The message is clear, and I’m simply another messenger. | |||
| To quote the Rumsfeld Commission Report statement in the form of a question: | |||
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| Three pages follow of references with associated web URLs. Clicking on them should take you to the website from where reports, etc. can be downloaded. | |||
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| 1. A brief note of
how this was done was published in the Proceedings of the Institute of
Electrical Engineers (UK): Radio Observations on the Russian Satellites,
IEE, Proc of the Institution, Vol 105, March 20, 1958.
2. "The Global Positioning System: Assessing National Policies" Rand Critical Technologies Institute, Scott Pace et al, January 31, 1996. 3. The emergence of GPSIII, a "modernized" version of GPS speaks to the limitations of the current GPS constellation but does not address the sole-means issue. 4. GPS Risk Analysis Study: Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, January 29, 1999. http://www.jhuapl.edu/transportation/aviation/gps/ 5. Vulnerability Assessment of the Transportation Infrastructure Relying on the Global Positioning System: A study required by the Presidential Decision Directive (No.63) covering transportation only. U.S. Department of Transportation, Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, Cambridge, MA. (Not Released) 6. Many commendable adjectives can be used to describe the authors and their text. The book is peppered with several hundred quotations, references and footnotes. The authors site history accurately showing careful research and an intimate knowledge of military actions going back to ancient Greek wars. Their research and analysis into current (1999) DOD strategies is thorough. Their insight and perceptivity needs to be respected even if politically and militarily unacceptable. The book is available on line from: http://www.intelbriefing.com/if/uw1.htm 7. References to the texts mentioned and background material used in this presentation are provided at the end of this text. Most of the material is available over the Internet by using the URL’s given. An electronic copy of this text will enable the URL to be reached by clicking on the link. 8. Since making this presentation on January 22, 2001, the draft report of Phase III of the United States Commission on National Security/21st Century was released to the public at a press conference on January 31, 2001. http://www.nssg.gov The findings of this Commission confirm and support the other reference texts. 9. Donald Rumsfeld was confirmed by the Senate on January 19, 2001 as the Secretary of Defense for the new Administration under President George W. Bush. 10. The text has been reformatted for clarity but is taken from the report verbatim. 11. By coincidence, the Wall Street Journal carried four major articles on BSE the Friday before this address and further, the paper carried lead articles on all three days of the ION meeting highlighting the very points made in this address. 12. This cause of the disease spreading is now known to be the result of using carcass remnants in cattle feed to provide protein. The deficiency in adhering to subsequent legislation is another story. 13. As a result of the human fatalities, and as a precautionary measure, the U.S. has forbidden blood donation from anyone that has visited Europe for more than 6 months in the last 10 years. 14. It should be noted that China has an operating Loran-C system and has recently installed a high power transmitter in the center of the country for the transmission of precise time using a loran format. At the International Loran Association’s annual meeting in November, 2000, a Chinese delegate spoke of a second high power transmitter installation proposed for North China to ensure that there was timing coverage throughout the country. 15. The Northwest Europe Loran-C System (NELS) is operated by a Coordinating Office in Norway for the treaty participants of Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Norway and The Netherlands. |
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Unrestricted Warfare | http://www.intelbriefing.com/if/uw1.htm |
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National Security/Emergency Preparedness Implications of GPS Timing | http://www.ncs.gov/n2/content/technote/tnv6n2/tnv6n2.htm |
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Chinese Military Book Advocates Terrorism, Computer Warfare in "War of the Future" Against America | http://waterbarrel.com/prepare/prechinese.html |
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Recent Disclosures Underscore GPS Vulnerability to Jamming | http://www.eplrs.com/public/news/00010.htm |
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Jamming of GPS is Opposed | http://www.irbs.com/lists/live-aboard/9903/0168.html |
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Cyberterrorism Resource Center | http://www.globaldisaster.org/cyberterrorrescen.html |
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Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) | http://www.fas.org/irp/program/disseminate/siprnet.htm |
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Challenges and Opportunities Posed by Emerging Technology | http://www.vcds.dnd.ca/DGSP/analysis/tech_e.asp |
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The Information Revolution and National Security | http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/ssipubs/pubs2000/inforev/inforev.htm |
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Cyber Threats and the U.S. Economy | http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/cyberthreats_022300.html |
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Lists of Hacked Sites - U.S. Military: Navy (navy.mil) | http://www.attrition.org/mirror/attrition/navy.mil.html |
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Global Jam Echelon Day - texts | http://emedia.free.fr/jed2.htm |
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Wanna Jam it? (GPS/GLONASS) A little Net savvy is all you need to block satellite signals | http://hazelnutspread.com/satcomjammer.htm |
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WWW sites related to Terrorism from PRICENET | http://www.infowar.com/Class_3/00/class3_061300a_j.shtml |
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China's New War Fighting Skills - American Foreign Policy Council Investigative Report | http://www.afpc.org |
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The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation | http://www.mid.ru/mid/eng/econcept.htm |
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Hegemon: The Chinese Plan to Dominate Asia and the World: Stephen Mosher | ISBN 1-893554-08-2 Encounter Books http://www.encounterbooks.com |
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Betrayal: How the Clinton Administration Undermined American Security: Bill Gertz | ISBN 0-89526-317-3 Regenery Publishing Inc., Washington DC |
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The Cox Report - China and National Security: Christopher Cox | ISBN 1-57646-063-0 Electronic Paperback, http://www.quietvision.com |
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The China Threat: How the People's Republic Targets America: Bill Gertz | ISBN 0-89526-281-9 Regenery Publishing Inc., Washington DC |
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Joint Vision 2020: Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff - General H. Shelton | http://www.dtic.mil/jv2020/jvpub2.htm |
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Satellite Communications for the Warfighter | http://www-cgsc.army.mil/djco/aap/A537/syllabus/lsn4app1.htm |
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Cyber Threats and Information Security - Meeting the 21st Century Challenge: CSIS Report | http://www.csis.org |
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Indications, Analysis, and Warning Program: Electric Power: National Infrastructure Protection Center | http://www.nipc.gov/infosharing/infosharing3.htm |
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Taking Charge: A Bipartisan Report to the President Elect on Foreign Policy and National Security: Rand | http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1306 |
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In Battling Mad Cow, Britain Spawns Heaps of Pulverized Cattle: | Wall Street Journal Jan 8, 2001 |
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China Trade Relations Working Group: China and Regional Security The White House | http://chinapntr.gov/factsheets/Regional%20Security.htm |
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Remarks by the President on China at Florida's New Market Opportunity Program: The White House | http://chinapntr.gov/messages/presstatement0731.htm |
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An Intelligence Cycle for Low-Observable Indications and Warning (Terrorism) | http://www.homelanddefense.org/FRIntelCycle.cfm |
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US Finds International Youth Plot to Disable Internet | http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/nm/20010114/wr/crime_dc_4.html |
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The Global Positioning System: Assessing National Priorities: Scott Pace et al. Doc. MR-614-OSTP | http://www.rand.org/Abstracts/abstracts.html |
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Vulnerability Assessment of the Transportation Infrastructure Relying on the GPS: James Carroll | http://www.volpe.dot.gov/gps/gpsvuln.html |
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GPS Risk Analysis Study: Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory | http://www.jhuapl.edu/transportation/aviation/gps |
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Norman Y. Mineta: Biography and Background | http://osecnt13.osec.doc.gov/public.nsf/docs/about-the-secretary |
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GPS Vulnerability: Navy Report | http://cno-n6.hq.navy.mil/n63/Briefs/Vulnerability.ppt |
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Bachus, Others Call for Continued U.S. Military Presence to Protect the Panama Canal | http://www.house.gov/bachus/pr112299.htm |
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Chinese Threaten "Unrestricted War": The Intellectual Activist | http://www.intellectualactivist.com/tia/archives/sept99.html |
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DOD
Info. Security: Serious Weakness Continues to Place Defense Operations
at Risk:
GAO Rpt AIMD-99-107 |
http://www.gao.gov |
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Activism, Hacktervism, and Cyberterrorism: The Internet as a Tool for Influencing Foreign Policy | http://www.terrorism.com/documents/denning-infoterrorism.html |
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Cyber Crime: Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office | http://www.ciao.gov |
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The "Love Bug" Asymmetric Warfare, and Other Computer Attacks; Future National Security Implications | http://emergency.com/2000/compdefnse-implc.htm |
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Global Positioning System and Navigation Warfare Conference | http://cno-n6.hq.navy.mil/n63/Briefs_available.htm |
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Bush eyes overhaul of e-security | http://www.computerworld.com/cwi/story/0,1199,NAV47_STO55335.00.html?OpenDocument&-f |
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Privacy of Mobile Phone Location Technology: | http://www.washtech.com/news/telecom/5124-1.html |
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Kosovo ushered in Cyberwar: Federal Computer Week | http://208.201.97.5/pubs/fcw/1999/0927/fcw-newscyberwar-09-27-99.html |
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Commentary on GPS and Trusted Time Sources | http://www.infowar.com/chezwinn/articles032000/GPSCommentary.shtml |
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Beam Weapons as a New Force: Military and C4I | http://www.infowar.com/MIL_C4I/00/mil_c4i_072000a_j.shtml |
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U.S. Draws Attention to Information Warfare Threat: Military and C4I | http://www.infowar.com/MIL_C4I/00/mil_c4i_122600a_j.shtml |
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Defense Department Computers Vulnerable to Attack: Military and C4I | http://www.infowar.com/MIL_C4I/00/mil_c4i_120800a_j.shtml |
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New Year's Distributed Denial of Service Advisory: National Infrastructure Protection Center | http://www.nipc.gov/warnings/advisories/2000/00-063.htm |
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Chinese AF 3-Yr Modernization Plan Detailed; Russia Pledges Weapons to China for Destruction of US Navy | http://www.afpc.org/crm/crm342.htm |
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Ziang pledges reunification with Taiwan before leaving office: China Reform Monitor | http://www.afpc.org/crm/crm338.htm |
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Chinese leaders nervous over Yugoslav people power: China Reform Monitor | http://www.afpc.org/crm/crm340.htm |
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US Companies sell products at Beijing police intelligence fair: China Reform Monitor | http://www.afpc.org/crm/crm339.htm |
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PLA Promotes New Book on Info-Warfare; China Reform Monitor | http://www.afpc.org/crm/crm271.htm |
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China WTO Accession Deal: A strong deal in the best interests of America: China Trade Relations Grp | http://www.chinapntr.gov/factsheets/2pgfactsheet.htm |
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CIA Concerned About Russian Cyber-Warfare; Russian Reform Monitor | http://afpc.org/rrm/rrm752.htm |
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China's New War Fighting Skills: Emerging Threats to the US, India, Taiwan and the Asia/Pacific Region | http://afpc.org/issues/thailand.htm |
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TRW, US Army, Israel Raise the Bar for Directed Energy Systems: TRW News | http://www.trw.com/ssnews/pressrelease/detailinfo/1,1433,2_9_18^3^18^494,00.html |
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Unrestricted War: The Leveler-China | http://www.indiapolicy.org/lists/india_policy/2000/Mar/msg00046.html |
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PLA Revises the Art of War: Asymmetrical warfare - terrorism, computer hacking, economic sabotage … | http://www.insightmag.com/archive/200002063.shtml |
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USA's dependence on satellites places nation at risk | USA Today, Jan 11, 2001 |
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Mocking Tradition and Practice: Nato's War and World Security | http://www.emperors-clothes.com/analysis/security2.htm |
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List and Links to intelligence and counter intelligence articles and papers at C4I.org | http://www.c4i.org |
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The New Cold War: Washington Times, Jan. 1, 2001 | http://asp.washtimes.com/printarticle.asp?action=print&ArticleID=ed-column-2000123020463 |
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GPS Vulnerability: Study terms of reference for Naval Research Advisory Committee | http://nrac.onr.navy.mil/webspace/exec_sum/99gps.html |
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Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization | http://www.space.gov |
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GPS Security Architecture: A Work In Progress Entirely new architecture for user equipment needed. | Global Positioning and Navigation News, Jan 10, 2001 |
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Cyberwarfare: China moving aggressively to incorporate Cyberwarfare into military lexicon. | CRS Report RL30735, November 15, 2000 |
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Special focus on Cyberwarfare: Center for the Study of Technology and Society | http://www.tecsoc.org/natsec/focuscyberwar.htm |
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Defending America's Cyberspace: National Plan for Information Systems Protection: The White House 2000 | http://www.ciao.gov/CIAO_Document_Library/document_index_date.htm |
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New
World Is Coming: American Security in the 21st Century – Major
themes and implications
Phase I report of the United States Commission on National Security/21st Century |
http://www.nssg.gov |
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New
World Is Coming: American Security in the 21st Century - Supporting
Research and Analysis
Phase I report of the United States Commission on National Security/21st Century |
http://www.nssg.gov |
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New
World Is Coming: American Security in the 21st Century – Study
Addendum
Phase I report of the United States Commission on National Security/21st Century |
http://www.nssg.gov |
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Seeking
a National Strategy – A Concert for Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom
Phase II report of the United States Commission on National Security/21st Century |
http://www.nssg.gov |
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Road
Map for National Security: Imperative for Change
Phase III report of the United States Commission on National Security/21st Century |
http://www.nssg.gov |
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